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Jose Guadalupe Perez-Jungo (Perez) appeals from his conviction
possession of a controlled substance. He challenges the denial of his motion to
suppress evidence found and seized during an investigative detention.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
The state charged Perez with one felony count of possession of a
controlled

substance

and

one

paraphernalia. (R, pp. 52-53.)
his detention had been illegal.

misdemeanor

count

of

possession

of

filed a motion to suppress, asserting that
(R, pp. 67-80, 100-04, 109-13.)

The state

responded by arguing that the initial encounter was voluntary, and escalated into
a justified detention and search upon discovery of incriminating evidence. (R,
. 92-98.) The district court found the following facts:
The Defendant was parked with his vehicle turned off near 100
North near 475 East in Jerome, Idaho on November 1, 2012 at
approximately 1:36 a.m. Trooper Berny Marquez pulled in behind
the Defendant's vehicle and activated his overhead lights. After
approaching the vehicle and speaking with the Defendant, Marquez
returned to his patrol vehicle to contact dispatch to provide
registration information and to request a canine unit.
Within ten minutes three other officers in three separate patrol cars
arrived on the scene. No canine unit ever arrived. The Defendant
was told to exit the vehicle. He was questioned, and his vehicle was
searched from the outside with officers shining flashlights inside his
vehicle's windows. The officers saw what they believed to be a
controlled substance and paraphernalia. The items were removed
from the vehicle and tested. The Defendant was eventually arrested
and charged with felony Possession of a Controlled Substance
(Cocaine), a violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1) and misdemeanor
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a violation of I.C. § 37-2734A.
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, pp. 116-17.) The Court concluded that

evidence demonstrated that the

initial encounter was a seizure, but that the seizure was justified by both the
community caretaking function and reasonable suspicion the vehicle was parked
illegally. (R., pp. 128-32.) The officer then lawfully expanded the stop based on
evidence, obtained upon contacting Perez, that Perez was under the influence of
drugs or alcohol and suspicion there may be drugs in the vehicle. (R., p. 135.)
The court denied the motion to suppress in relevant part.

(R., p.139.)

Perez

later entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving the right to appeal from the
denial of his motion to suppress, and filed an appeal timely from the entry of
judgment. (R., pp. 157-58,172-78, 193-94.)
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issue on

as:

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion to
Suppress because his detention was unduly prolonged and,
therefore, the subsequent search of his person and vehicle violated
the Fourth Amendment?
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Perez failed to show any error in the district court's conclusion that
there was reasonable suspicion justifying the detention that led to the plain-sight
discovery of contraband in Perez's vehicle?
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ARGUMENT
Perez Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court's Conclusion That
There Was Reasonable Suspicion Justifying The Detention That Led To The
Plain-Sight Discovery Of Contraband In Perez's Vehicle
A.

Introduction
Officers discovered contraband in Perez's vehicle in plain sight. (R., pp.

117, 119-20.)

Perez contends that prior to this happening he was illegally

detained, either initially or that the length of his detention exceeded the
reasonable scope of the initial detention. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-20.) Perez has
failed to show error, because he has failed to challenge the grounds found by the
district court to justify the initial detention, and application of the law to the facts
of the case shows no illegal extension of the detention.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Faith,
141 Idaho 728,729-730,117 P.3d 142, 143-144 (Ct. App. 2005).

C.

This Court Must Affirm The District Court's Unchallenged Determination
That The Initial Detention Was Justified By Reasonable Suspicion That
Perez's Vehicle Was Parked Illegally
Where the district court articulates a ground for a ruling that is

unchallenged on appeal, the appellate court will affirm on the unchallenged
ground. State v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510, 517-18, 164 P.3d 790, 797-98 (2007)
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on
~'-=-'-'

grounds

151 Idaho 889,265 P.3d 502 (2011)); =~~~~=-:. 131 Idaho 364,

956 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Ct App. 1998).
evidence demonstrated the

The district court concluded that the

detention was justified by both the community

caretaking function and reasonable suspicion "that the vehicle was parked
illegally" in violation of LC. § 49-659(1), either of which justified the initial
detention of Perez.

(R., pp. 128-32.) Because Perez does not challenge the

district court's determination that the circumstances gave rise to reasonable,
articulable suspicion that Perez's vehicle was parked in violation of I.C. § 49659(1), he has failed to challenge one basis for the district court's ruling. The
district court must therefore be affirmed on the unchallenged ground.

The Detention Was Not Unreasonably Prolonged
It is well established that a traffic stop is constitutionally justified if
supported by reasonable suspicion that a traffic law has

violated.

United

==~==, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); =-=-=-:...:.....:.......::...:.:..;:~, 135 Idaho 159,161

n.1, 15 P.3d 1167, 1169 n.1 (2000),
P.3d 673, 675 (Ct App. 2010).

150 Idaho 300,302,246

"[A] detention initiated for one investigative

purpose may disclose suspicious circumstances that

expanding the

investigation to other possible crimes." State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 916,
42

3d 706, 709 (Ct App. 2001). The degree of suspicion necessary is less

than probable cause but more than speculation.

150 Idaho at 302, 246

P.3d at 675. "A reasonable-suspicion determination 'need not rise to the level
required

probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a

5

preponderance of the evidence standard.'" State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, '126,
233 P.3d 52, 57 (2010) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274
(2002)). Reasonable suspicion is "determined on the basis of the totality of the
circumstances." State v. Widner, _Idaho _,317 P.3d 737, 741 (2013).
The district court concluded that, after contacting Perez, Trooper Marquez
had "objective and specific articulable facts to support his suspicion that the
Defendant had been or was about to engage in impaired driving or drug
trafficking." (R., p. 135.) Specifically:
Marquez inquired as to why the Defendant was there, and he told
Marquez that he was waiting for a friend and someone told him
there was a potential job site nearby
the area is remote
with no businesses or
nearby, so the Defendant's
reason for
"'Gems unlikely. Marquez observed the
and glassy eyes which indicate potential
alcohol impairment. Marquez also observed the Santa
Muerte statue which is, as Marquez has learned through drug
interdiction training, a common patron saint to drug traffickers.
(Id. (footnote omitted).) The totality of the circumstances confronting the officer
did provide reasonable suspicion of either potential DUI or involvement in drugrelated activities. Perez's act of parking in a remote area at about 1:30 in the
morning is somewhat suspicious in and of itself.

Combined with his physical

appearance, "unlikely" explanation for why he was there, and prominent display
of a statuette associated with drugs, further investigation into a possible DUI or
drug-related crimes was constitutionally warranted.
Perez contends that bloodshot eyes "alone" do not provide reasonable
suspicion, asserting that this fact must be considered alone because he was not
parked "in a high crime area" and his explanation that he was looking for a job in

6

an

at 1:30 in the

(Respondent's brief,

"

was "forthright

. 12-14

only authority

admits is "contra").)

conceding Perez's major premise (that bloodshot eyes alone is not
evidence to create reasonable suspicion of being under the influence of drugs or
alcohol), Perez's argument is without merit. His argument is a blatant attempt to
have

Court apply something other than the totality of the circumstances

by providing justifications or excuses for the other evidence supporting
reasonable suspicion: an argument Perez admits is "contra" existing authority.
The district court did not err by concluding that Perez's explanation that he was
parked next to a field in a remote location at 1:30 in the morning because he had
heard of a job nearby was reasonably perceived by the officer as "unlikely"
instead of "forthright and reasonable."
Perez also requests this Court to ignore evidence of the significance of the
"Santa Muerte" statuette, by claiming that doing so is "profiling" and relying on
evidence his appellate attorney found on the internet. (Respondent's brief, pp. 2
n.2, 1 19, including n.3.)

not, however, object in the district court to

consideration of the evidence of the Santa Muerte statuette (or Jesus Malverdemarijuana leaf belt buckle later observed by the officer) on this ground. (Tr., p.
20, L. 22 - p. 21, L. 25; p. 25, L. 24

p. 26, L. 15.) Claims not made to the trial

court are not preserved and shouid be disregarded. State v. Parsons, 153 Idaho
666,668,289 P.3d 1059, 1061 (Ct. App. 2012) ("Idaho

appetl~

courts generally

will not consider an assertion of error on appeal unless the issue was preserved
in the trial court proceedings.") (citations omitted).
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Thus, the equal protection

challenge to the state's evidence must be disregarded.

His attempt to submit

new evidence for the first time on appeal is also improper. State v. Mitchell, 124
Idaho 374, 376 n.1, 859 P.2d 972, 974 n.1 (Ct App. 1993) (in rendering a
decision on the issues raised on appeal, the appellate court is "limited to review
of the record made below" and "will not consider new evidence that was never
before the trial court"). The state asks this Court to strike footnotes 2 and 3 from
the Appellant's brief. Again, Perez's attempt to get this Court to ignore some of
the circumstances known to the officer is contrary to law.
The totality of the circumstances, including the location, the time,
bloodshot eyes, an "unlikely" explanation for his presence, and a statuette
associated with drug trafficking on the dashboard, provided reasonable suspicion
of driving under the influence or that Perez was engaged in drug-related
activities.

Perez has failed to show that Trooper Marquez lacked reasonable

suspicion to detain Perez based on the information he had based on his initial
contact with Perez.

Perez's Claim That Trooper Marquez Prolonged The Detention By Not
Investigating A Possible DUI Is Both False And Irrelevant
Perez also argues that "Trooper Marquez never actually investigated Mr.
Peres-Jungo for driving under the influence" and "never intended to investigate
Mr. Perez-Jungo for driving under the influence." (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-16.)
This argument fails for four reasons. First, it was not preserved below; second, it
is irrelevant because the officers also had reasonable suspicion of drug crimes;
third, the record belies Perez's factual claim that the DUI investigation was
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abandoned; and, most

fourth, because Perez is ultimately

a

claim based on the officer's subjective intent rather than the objective standard
required by law.
First, Perez argued below that Trooper Marquez "unlawfully extended the
stop because Marquez had already determined that the vehicle was not
abandoned, that the vehicle was not stolen, that the occupant was not involved in
vandalism, and that the occupant was not in need of help." (R., p. 134.) He did
not claim Trooper Marquez failed to investigate him for DUI.

This issue is

therefore not preserved for appellate review.
Second, even if preserved, whether the police abandoned the DUI
investigation to pursue a drug investigation is constitutionally irrelevant.

"An

investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop."

153 Idaho 405, 409, 283

P.3d 722, 726 (2012) (quotes and citations omitted). "There is no rigid time limit
for determining when a detention has lasted longer than necessary; rather, a
court must consider the scope of the detention and the law enforcement
purposes to be served, as well as the duration of the stop."
1

Idaho 490,496,198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App. 2008).
The district court concluded that the officers had reasonable suspicion to

investigate both a possible DUI and a possible drug-related crime, (R., p, 135,)
Therefore, the investigation of a possible drug crime was constitutionally
reasonable regardless of whether the DUI investigation was also pursued.
Danney, 153 Idaho at

0, 283 P,3d

726-27 (abandonment of investigation

9

into

infraction did render

unreasonable

officers had reasonable

suspicion of drug crime).
Third, the record in no way supports Perez's claim that the police
abandoned the DUI investigation.

The record shows that, after his initial

encounter with Perez (during which he developed reasonable suspicion of both
DUI and drug-related criminal activity), Trooper Marquez took Perez's license
and registration and contacted dispatch. (Tr., p. 24, Ls, 7-13,) He requested a
drug detection dog and backup.

(Tr., p. 24, L. 13 - p. 25, L, 3,)

In the ten

minutes it took backup to arrive Trooper Marquez conducted a status check on
Perez's license and to determine if there were any outstanding warrants. (Tr., p,
25, Ls, 4-18.) Once backup arrived Trooper Marquez re-contacted Perez, had
him step out of his vehicle, noted Perez's marijuana-themed belt buckle, and
asked Perez about "prior drug use."

(Tr" p. 25, L. 19 - p, 28,

1,)

Perez

admitted having smoked marijuana, but claimed it had been "a long time ago,"
(Tr., p 28, Ls. 2-3) At that point the other officers now on the scene alerted
Trooper Marquez to their discovery of evidence of contraband in plain sight. (Tr.,
p, 28, Ls, 4-18,)
Perez's claim that the police abandoned the DUI investigation prior to the
discovery of the contraband is unsupported by the record, Trooper Marquez, in
the approximately ten minutes in question, contacted dispatch to find out about
Perez's license and registration status and if he had any warrants,
asked Perez about drug use,

He also

Both of these lines of investigation are entirely

consistent with both a DUI investigation and a drug crime investigation, Perez's
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Trooper should
(Appellant's
absence

in

15) is without

in

or

any evidence that Trooper Marquez was an expert in field

testing to detect marijuana intoxication.

Trooper Marquez's investigation was

entirely reasonable, and Perez has failed to demonstrate otherwise on appeal.
Finally, Perez claims that Trooper Marquez never articulated that he was
conducting a DUI investigation during the course of that investigation and never
"intended!! to conduct a DUI investigation. (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-16.) Perez
cites no law that would make these claims relevant, for although an officer must
be able to articulate grounds for his suspicions to a court, Perez has cited no
authority for the novel argument that an officer must articulate the type of
investigation he is conducting, while he is conducting it, in order to have
conducted it. Perez is blatantly requesting this Court to apply a subjective test
when the law is crystal clear that the test is objective.

State v.

Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482,490,211 P.3d 91, 99 (2009) (employing an "objective
test that does not depend upon the individual officer's subjective thought
processes"). His argument is irrelevant.
The district court concluded that the initial detention in this case was
justified by reasonable suspicion of a parking violation and by the community
caretaking function.

Once the officer made contact with Perez he acquired

evidence creating reasonable suspicion of DUI or drug-related crimes.

Perez

has failed to show error in the district court's factual findings or analysis, and has
failed to show error on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully

Court

conviction.

DATED this 5th day of March, 201 .

Deputy Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of March, 2014, served a true
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a copy
addressed to:
KI BERL Y
SMITH
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

in the State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
to be
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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